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charged with the crime is Willie Olen Scott. Also, the
Criminal Indictment and True Bill of Tennessee, reveals
the name of William 0. Scott. Further, the Tennessee
copias reveals to the name of \Villiam 0. Scott.
After admission of the aforementioned exhibits over
the Defendant's objection the Defendant failed to produce any further evidence as to the identity of the person
sought to be extradited or any further evidence indicating
that the Plaintiff was a fugitive from justice. The record
shows that the Defendant submitted the matter to the
court on the apparent sufficiency of the two exhibits. (R8) The Petitioner submitted evidence to the lower court
that the Plaintiff was incarcerated in the State of Utal1
under the name of Willie Olen Scott (R-11). Further,
that the Plaintiff testified in his own behalf (R-14) and
testified that his true and legal name was Willie Olen
Scott (R-14), that he had never been known as Willliam 0.
Scott (R-14), and had not been in the State of Tennessee
on the 2nd day of December, 1955 (R-14).
On cross-examinati~on, the Petitioner testified that
his birth certificate does not bear the name William 0.
Scott (R-15). Further, that during his tour of duty in
the Army and discharge therefrom, that he went under
the name of Willie Olen Scott.
Petitioner submitted evidence of a transcript marked
as Exhibit 3, said transcript being the testimony of one
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Norman Hunter that the Plaintiff was n ot in the State of
Tennessee at the time of the alleged crime. The trans1

cript showed that the Plaintiff was under the surveillance
of Norman Hunter, agent for the Oklahoma State Crime
Bureau from the 20th day of November, 1955 to the 4th
day of December, 1955.
Upon the admittance of the evidence above indicated,
the Plaintiff and Defendant submitted the matter to the
court wherein the court denied the discharge of the
Petitioner pursuant to the Petitioner's writ.
DISPOSITION J\1:ADE BY THE LOWER COURT
The hearing on Plaintiff-Appellant's Writ of Habeas
Corpus was held on the 27th day of October, 1961 before
the Honorable J·oseph G. Jeppson, Judge of the Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. Upon
hearing of the evidence and arguments by counsel for
the respective parties, the Judge denied the Petitioner
discharge pursuant to writ.
RELIEF SOlTGHT ON APPEAL
Relief sought on appeal of reversal of trial court'5
judgment.
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S.TAT'EMENT OF POINTS
POINT 1
THAT THE

TRIAL COURT ERRED

IN DENYING

PLAINTIFF'S DISCHARGE ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE
DEFENDANT FAILED TO PROVE THAT THE PETITIONER
IS THE SAME PERSON SOUGHT TO BE EXTRADITED
BY THE STATE OF TENNESSEE.
POINT 2.
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DISCHARGE
OF THE PE·TITIONER IN THAT THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY AND CONVINCINGLY PROVED THAT THE PLAINTIFF
WAS NOT A FUGITIVE FROM JUSTICE.

ARGUMENT
POINT 1
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
PLAINTIFF'S DISCHARGE ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE
DEFENDANT FAILED TO PROVE THAT THE PETITIONER
IS THE SAME PERSON SOUGHT TO BE EXTRADITED
BY THE STATE OF TENNESSEE.

The court erred in denying Plaintiff's discharge on
the grounds that the Defendant failed to prove that the·
Petitioner is the sa1ne person sought to be extradited
by the State of Tennessee. It may be stated that upon
application of a Writ of Habeas Corpus to test the
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6
legality 'Of the detention in the proceedings for Habeas
Corpus, that the question of identity is one which may
be considered. See ex paTte M. B. Jowell (1920) 223
S. W. 456, 11 A.L.R. 1407, Holland vs. State) 53 Texas
Criminal Reports, 301 ,108 S. W. 1181, wherein the court
in the latter case stated, "If the alleged fugitive raises
the question of identity, and a finding of the District
,Judge that he is the party wanted, will be susrtained
if the evidence supports such finding, no matter what
name he went by in this State." Also see 25 Am. Jwr. Sec.
70. Further, it may he stated as a general principal of
law that the burden of proving the identity of the person
rests upon those seeking his deportation, where the person denies he is the person sought to be wanted.
Evidence is always admissible to show that the accused is not the person named in the warrant or indictment, and in such an event his identity with the person
named in the warrant must be clearly established. Ex
Parte IJ,fassee) 95 S.C. 315, 79 S.E. 97, 26 L.R.A. (N.S.
781) 22 Am. Jur. Sec. 50.
The courts have indicated that there exists a prima
facie case by the State w'herein the paper requesting the
Defendant to be extradited are properly authenticateJ
and executed. That in establishing the prima facie case
the State has met its burden and the burden of corning
forward is upon the Petitioner and the Petitioner must
with suffieiient proof overcome such prima facie case.
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See ex pa·rte Freeman, 80 Ariz. 21, 291 P2 795, ex p·arte
Arrington (l\1o.) 270 S. "\V. 2nd 39, Hagel vs. Hendricks
(:J\!Io. Appeals), 302 S. W. 323, (1957) andRe Action, 90
Ohio 100, 013 S.E. 2nd 577, (1949), wherein the Ohio
court stated that the Governor of the asylum state issues
his warrant and when this is done it is prima facie
evidence of all that is recited thereon.
It is apparent from the decisions rendered that when
t'he identity of the person sought to he extradited has
been questioned, the court uniformly permitted evidence
as to identity aside from the documents themse1lves. See
8-l: A.L.R. and cases cited thereunder. Thus, In Re McPhunn, there was testimony by the office who came witih
the warrant and other papers designed to sustain the
charge held to establish the identity of the prisoner. Also,
Re Charleston (1888; D.C.) 24 Fed. 531, wherein the identity was established by the Prisoner's own admission that
he was the person named in the Complaint and that he
executed the note alleged to he forged; also ex parte
Chung Kin Tow (1914; D.C.) 218 Fed. 185, wherein the
identity was established by the fair preponderence of
the evidence·; State vs. ex rel 1Ieyers vs. Allen (1.920)
83 Fla. 655, 92 S. 155, wherein the testimony of two
witnesses which was uncontradicted was submitted; also
People ex rel. Draper vs. Peterton 1.897) 17 Hun. 199
affirmed in [1879] 77 N.Y. 245), wherein the identity
1

was proved in evidence although an error in the Christian
nan1e appeared on the papers. Other cases have clearly
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established the rule that the use of photographs attached
to affidavits or depositions taken in the demanding
state in support of the identification of the prisoner has
been held to he proper when the identity has been questioned. See A.L.R. 343 and cases cited thereunder. In
the case of Ryan vs. Rogers (1923) 21 Wyo. 311, 132
P. 95, wherein the requisition papers named the alleged
fugitive as "Charles T. Crane, otherwise known as James
Ryan," the State of vYyoming offered testimony of
one 1\tfrs. Hope L. 1\ticEldowney who testified as to the
identification of the Petitioner as the person demanded
by the requisition and named in the indictment. The
Petitioner submitted evidence which contradicted Mrs.
McEldowney's testimony. The \Vyoming court held that
the evidence that the Petitioner was not the person
sought was clearly and satisfactorily established and
denied e·xtradition on that ground. In the case of In re
Serafford (1891) 59 Hun. 320, 120 N. N.Y. Supp. 943,
the

Petitioner's

own

witness

testified

that

the

Petitioner was known as the same person by the name
used in the rendition papers. The eourt held that this
was sufficient evidence and denied discharge. In the
case of Holland vs. State (1908) 53 Texas Criminal Law
Reports 301, 108 S.\V. 1181, the eourt applied the
docrine of iJdem sonans to the nan1es of •'George
Harland" and "George Holland" and applied this pre~tnnption

in the absence of any evidence to the contrary

and denied discharge. The principle of idem sonans has
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been held not to apply to the name of "William" and
"Willis.'' Thornily v. Prentice, 121 Iowa 89, 96 N.W. 728,
100 Am. St. Rep. 317. In the case of Fernandez v.
Phillips (1925) 268 lJ. S. 311, 69 Law Ed. 970, 45 S. Ct.,
541 the warrant for arrest named the accused
merely by his first and middle name and the court
upheld the warrant since there was sufficient other
evidence as to the identity of the petitioner. ~1ere mistakes in spelling or discrepancies in name's appearing in
the requisition papers or warrant will not defeat rendition, provided there is sufficient testimony identifying
the accused with the person nan1ed in such papers. 2.2
Am. Jur., Sec. 38, p. 276.
Thus, the Petitioner in the case at bar respectfully
subrnits that under the cases above enumerated and
under the law as it exists at the present time, it was
incumbent upon the Defendant to submit proof of
the identity of the accused when the identity of the
accused was disputed. Further, the Pet~tioner submits
that when there exists an obvious discrepancy in the
requisition papers themselves, it is incumbent upon
the Defendant to submit outside proof of identity.
r:rhe discrepancy in the name in the case at bar is
apparent. Defendant's Exhibit one indicates that the
Petition for Requsition made to the Governor of Tennessee states in Paragraph four that WILLIAM 0.
SCOTT is the person named in the copy of the Warrant
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Criminal Indictment and Capius as the person sought.
Further, it is indicated that said copies were attached to
the Petition for Requisition. The court's attention is called to the fact that the State vVarrant attached thereto
refers to WILLIE OLEN SCOTT. The indictment refers to vVILLIAM 0. SCOT'T. 'The Capius refers to and
uses the name WILLIAM 0. SCOTT. Paragraph four
of the Requisition indicates that WILLIAM 0. SCOTT
COlnmitted armed robbery. Paragraph six alleges that
WILLIAM 0. SCOT~T is known or believed to he
in the Utah State Prison and that the Petitioner received
a letter from Clarence Dent, Chief Records Officers of
the lTtah State Prison, and advises that WILLIAM 0.
SCOT'T referred to in said letter as WILLIE 0. SCOTT
1s a prisoner in the State of Utah.
Under the discrepancies above noted, the Petitioner
states that the Defendant was obliged to submit other
evidence that the Petitioner was the same person requested in the requisition papers. The above cases cited
clearly show that this burden is not so onerous or overwhelming to the Defendant and the cases further indicate
that the Defendant's right to sub1nit evidence as to the
identity of the accused is lDldisputed. See 84 A.L.R.
346. The petitioner has found no case wherein the court
has held in the face of the apparent discrepancy in names
that the prima facie ease was sufficient to warrant that
the identity of the accused had been sufficiently established.
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However, if the eourt fee,ls that the prima facie
case established by the rendition papers is sufficient,
then the court must consider the evidence submitted by
the Petitioner in the lower court. The court's attention
is called to the fact that at the hearing in the lower court,
the Petitioner took the stand (R-14) and te,stified that
his name was WILLIE OLEN SCOT'T and further that
he had never been known as WILLIAl\f 0. SCOT'T.
(R-1-±). Also, that he was not in the State of Tennessee
on the 2nd day of December, 1955 (R-14). On crossexamination, the petitioner testified that to the best of
his knowledge his birth certificate was not made out in
the name of vVILLIAl\f 0. SCOTT. (R-15). Also, that
during his tour of duty in the United States Army and
discharge therefrom that he went under the name of
vVILLIE OLEN SCOTT. In the face of such evidence,
which evidence is uncontradicted by the Defendant,
the Petitioner has by the fair preponderence of the evidence proved that he was not the person sought by the
requisition papers from the State of Tennessee.
under such circumstances, it has been uniformly
held that the Petitioner should be discharged in the
absence of any evidence by the asylum state showing that
the Petitioner was the same person sought by the demanding State.

Mere mistakes in spelling or discrepencies in names
appearing in the requisition papers or warrant will not
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defeat rendition, provided there is sufficient testimony
identifying the accused with the person named in such
papers. 22 Am. J ur. Sec. 38, p. 276. Evidence is always
admissible to show that the accused is not the person
named in the warrant or indictment, and in such an
event his identity with the person named in the warrant
must be clearly established. Ex parte Massee, 95 S. C.
315, 79 S. E. 97, 26 L. R. A. (N. S. 781) 22 Am. Jur.
Sec. 50.
POINT 2.
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DISCHARGE
OF THE PETITIONER IN THAT THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY AND CONVINCINGLY PROVED THAT THE PLAINTIFF
WAS NOT A FUGITIVE FROM JUSTICE.

The majority of t'he cases support the general rule
that one held upon a governor's warrant for extradition
to another state may upon Habeas Corpus proceedings
prove absence from the demanding state at the time of
the alleged crime as a fact defeating the jurisdiction
of the asylum state to render him to demanding state
for trial, or in order words to prove that he was not
a fugitive from justice within the United States Constitution provision whereby extradition is provided for.
See 61 A.L.R. 716. See In re Lonardo (1928) 272 P.
1066. In the case of In re Lonardo, supra, the evidence
established that the petitioner was in San Francisco at
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the time and before and after the alleged crime. ~This
evidence consisted of affidavits of ten pe~rsons to that
effect. In the case of State vs. Gains vs. W esthughes
(1928) 318 Mo. 9~28, 2 S. W. 2nd 612, the court allowed
evidence tending to show that the petitioner was not
actually present in the demanding state at the time of
the commission of the alleged offense.
In regards to the degree and character of proof
the cases do not support any definite rule as to the
degree and character of proof required in order to
defeat the prima facie case made by the governor's
-vvarrant for extradition. The language the courts have
used is that the burden is upon the petitioner to prove
clearly and satisfactorily as a condition of his release
that he was not in the demanding state at the time of
the commission of the crime for which he was accused.
If the evidence is merely contradictory, the accussed
person is not entitled to discharge. 22 Am. J ur. 5-±,
p. 294. See State ex rel. Rogers v.s. M erename (192,7)
172 ~finn. 401, 215 N. W. 863. In that case the court
held that the testimony of four witnesses beside the
petitioner himself did not sustain the burden of proving
the petitioner's absense. In the case of People ex rel.
Sherman v. Bar (1928) 131 Misc. 915, 229 N.Y. Supp.
268, the Court held that the burden upon the
petitioner was to show by conclusive evidence he was
not within the demanding state. The court further deemed that the evidence became conclusive when it estah-
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lished beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of the
fact at issue. The cases which have dealt w1th the burden
of proof clearly establish that the burden of proof lies
with the petitioner to show the absence from the demanding state at the time of the alleged crime, in order to
overcome the· prima facie case made by the go¥ernor's
warrant. See State ex rel. Gains vs: Westhughes (1928)
supra.
There does appear confusion as to the evidence
admitted to prove alibi and evidence to prove that the
petitioner was not within the jurisdiction. Thls is clearly
noted in Gr.ace vs. Doggan 151 Miss. 267, 117 S. 596.
(1928). In the 'case of Appleyard v.s. ~71lass. 203 U.S. 222,
51 Lawyer's Ed. 161, 27 Sup. Ct.· Reporters, 122, 7 Annotated Cases 1073, the Supreme Court of the United
States held that in issuing an executive warrant two
facts must appear to the governor of the state to whom
a demand for extra;dition warrant is presented.
''First, that the person demanded is substantially charged with the crime in the demanding
state and second the persons demanded is a fugitive from justice, the latter question being one of
fact to be decided by the governor. How far the
governor's decision may be reviewed judiciously
in a proceeding in \Vrit of Habeas Corpus or
whether it is not conclusive of questions is not
settled by harmonious judicial decisions, nor by
any authoritative decisions of this court. It is
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conceded that the determination of the fact by the
Executive of the State in issuing his warrant for
arrest upon demand made on that ground whether
the Writ contains a recital of express finding to
that effect or not, must be regarded as sufficient
to justify the removal until t'he presumption in its
favor is overruled by contrary proof. Also see ex
parte Reggel, 114 U.S. 642, 29 Lawyer's Ed. 250, 5
S. Ct. Reports 1148, 5 Am. Cr. Reports 218."
1

In the case of ex parte Shoema:ker (1914) 25 Cal.
App. 551, 144 P. 985, Petition for rehearing denied
(1924), the petitioner filed a Writ of Habeas Corpus
to contest the extradition proceeding from the State
of Illinois wherein it was alleged that he was guilty of
crimes of conspiracy and larceny, said crimes to have been
cmnmitted in the City of Chicago, State of Illinois ·on the
8th day of J nne, 1912. This case illustrates a good
example of the conflict between evidence as to an alibi
evidence that the petitioner was not a fugitive fron1
justice. The court struck down the Attorney's General's
argument in the case wherein the attorney general stated
that the question involved the guilt or innocence of a
crime and thus he could not set up the testimony of the
alibi. The court, in striking down the Attorney General's
argument, indicated that the question presented in this
proceeding is not whether the Petitioner was present
at the scene of the alleged crime but whether he was
within the borders of the demanding state at the time
said crime was committed. Obviously, if he was not
in the said state at the said time he cannot be a fugitive
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from justice within the meaning of the Constitution and
the laws of the United States authorizing the extradition of fugitives from justice. The eourt quoted Hiate
vs. Crockrand 188 U. S. 691, 23 S. Ct. 457, 47 Lawyer's
Ed. 657. The court further went on to cite the case
of People vs. McAughlin 145 App. Div. 513, 130 N. a
New York Supplement 458. A New York court struck
the Attorney General's argument as being unsound and
stated,
"an alibi in its general features consists of proof
that the Defendant was not at the· scene of the
crime at the time of its commission. Proof that
the Prisone,r was not in the demanding state at
the time of the commission of the crime is necessary proof that he was not at the scene of the
crime. But the question invo~ved in extradition
proceedings is not whether the Defendant was
at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, but whether he was anywhere within
the dmanding state when the crime was committed. The latter question had nothing to do
with the guilt or innocence, hut it has all to do
with the question of whether the prisoner has
fled from the demanding state, and therefore, is
a fugitive from justice."
In the California case the Attorney General submitted certain affidavits to prove that the Petitioner
was within the State of Illinois 18 days prior, and approxilnately three weeks subsequent, to- the day upon
which the larceny with which he was charged was com-
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mitted. The California Court indicated that the circumstances cannot be said to go any further than to show
he might have been in Illinois on the 8th day of June.
The eourt further went on for the sake of argument to
concede that the state had proven that the Petitioner was
''fugitive from justiee" from the State of Illinois.
"However, after considering the petitioner's
affidavit together with the affidavit 'Of his wife
whieh affidavit indicated that he was not in the
State of Illinois and stated that situation confronting the court in such that either the court must
give full weight to the proof adduced by the Petitioner or hold that from such proof there being
practieally no showing by the Respondent to justify a eontrary view there at least arises grave
doubt as to the pre~sence of the Petitioner within
the boundaries of the State of Illinois on the day
that the alleged commission of the crime charged
in the indietment as to generate and support the
conviction that to lend judieial sanetion to his
removal under such cireumstances would involve
an unlawful and wrongful menace to an invasion
of his inalienable Constitutional rights." See p.
990.
In the ease at Bar, the Petitioner's testimony clearly
showed that he was not within jurisdictional limits of
the demanding state at the time of the alleged crime
(R.-14). Further, Petitioner submitted into evidence' the
testimony of one Norman Hunter, agent of the Oklahoma,
State Crime Bureau, taken in the case of State of Utah
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v. Willie Olen Scott, Third District Court, Salt Laik:e
County, case No. 15023, wherein said Norman Hunter
testified that he had the petitioner under surveillance
in the State ,of Oklahoma from 20 Nov. to 4 Dec. 1955. It
should be observed that the above evidence was undisputed and uncontroverted.
The Petitioner respectfully submits that the Petitioner has clearly and satisfactorily shown that he was
not in the demanding state and thus not a fugitive fron1
justice. There being no evidence to the contrary, the
Trail Court erred failing to find that the Petitioner
had sufficiently met his burden and in failing to grant
the Petitioner discharge.
CONCLUSION
,The Defendant failed in meeting the burden of proof
before the lower court as to the identity of the accused.
The Defendant was obligated to come forward with
independent evidence as the identity of the accused and
having relied solely upon the prin1a facie case of the
Governor's warrant,in face of the Petitioner's testimony,
which was uncontradicted, the Defendant failed to sufficiently establish the identity of the person named in
the Governor's warrant.

:B-,urther, the evidence and

testjmony of the Petitioner clearly shows that he was
not a fugitive from justice.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

